A Controversy of Faces: Images from Bali and Abu Ghraib by Philpott S
The definitive version of this article is published by Taylor and Francis as: 
Simon Philpott. A Controversy of Faces: Images from Bali and Abu Ghraib. Journal 
for Cultural Research 2005, 9(3), 227-244. 
http://www.informaworld.com/openurl?genre=article&issn=1479-
7585&volume=9&issue=3&spage=227 
 
A Controversy of Faces: Images from Bali and Abu 
Ghraib1 
 
Abstract: 
The Bali bombing of 2002 and the US war against Iraq have been partly 
defined as media events by a series of photographs depicting the perpetrators 
of serious crimes in attitudes of jocularity. Photographs of ‘the smiling 
bombers’ and US torturers at Abu Ghraib have caused shock and outrage 
because their grinning, smiling and laughing seems starkly at odds with the 
criminal acts for which the bombers and torturers have been charged, and, in 
some cases, convicted. Yet divergent meanings have been assigned to the 
photographs by western political elites. While the Bali bombers have been 
characterised as representing all that is wrong with and barbaric about 
militant Islam, the Abu Ghraib torturers have been dissociated from the US 
military and its values through their representation as a few isolated 
miscreants. However, I analyse the smiling of the bombers and torturers as 
forms of symbolic communication entailing resistance and mockery of state 
power on the part of the bombers, and domination and knowing humiliation 
on the part of the torturers. The clamping of meaning around these images by 
powerful political interests forecloses on the possibility of a deeper 
understanding of what is at stake in the war on terror and, for ordinary 
consumers of these images, encourages complicity in the rolling back of civil 
and political rights. 
 
 
 
‘…it is clear from even the most cursory glance at any dictionary that of the 
many senses in which the English words smile, smirk, and grin have 
                                                 
1 Earlier versions of this article were presented at the Postcolonial Roundtable of the 
Postcolonial Research Group, University of Newcastle, October 6th 2004 and at the Religion 
and Politics in the International Multicultural Society panel at the British International 
Studies Association conference on December 20th 2004. My thanks to the participants at both 
those events for insightful comments. I also wish to extend particular thanks to Kate Manzo, 
Richard Fox, Robert Schütze, David Campbell and Pam Allen for their comments on written 
drafts and / or for suggesting helpful materials that may otherwise have escaped my 
attention. I hope the article lives up to the quality of their advice and suggestions.  
descended to us from earlier usage and word forms…a surprising number 
have nothing at all to do with happiness, pleasure, good cheer, empathetic 
communication, or affection. On the contrary, many clearly relate to 
craftiness, mockery, greed, cynicism, malevolence, gloating, and plain 
lewdness. ’ (Trumble 2004, 85-86) 
 
Two series of photographs involving only a handful of people look to have 
laid claim to determining how the Bali bombing of October 2002 and the US’s 
ongoing war against Iraqi insurgents are to be remembered in the future. The 
so-called smiling bombers deeply offended Australian sensibilities already 
stretched to the limit in the wake of the bombing of a popular Kuta beach bar 
which left 202 people dead, the largest component of which was Australian 
tourists.  The other photographs are of US service personnel engaged in acts 
of abuse and torture of Iraqi detainees at the now doubly infamous Abu 
Ghraib prison. The photographs themselves have quite distinct origins. 
Photographs of the Bali bombers are almost exclusively the product of 
commercial mass media and have been circulated throughout the 
international public domain whereas the Abu Ghraib photographs are 
produced by individual US service personnel and were initially intended for 
circulation among colleagues, friends and family. Their appearance in the 
wider public domain arose largely as a result of investigative journalism 
stimulated by persistent rumours of their existence.  
 
What both sets of images have in common is that the perpetrators of quite 
heinous crimes are smiling broadly for their respective audiences and it is this 
in particular that drew me to thinking about the photographs, their effects on 
public commentary and perceptions of identity. On the surface of it, none of 
those depicted in the photographs seem to have much to smile about. 
Suspects arrested for the Bali bombing in late 2002, and particularly Amrozi 
bin Nurhasyim, have smiled each time they have appeared before the media, 
itself somewhat unusual given we have seen very little of other terror 
suspects held in custody, particularly those incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay. 
For many Australians published images of the so-called smiling bomber 
heaped insult upon the tragedy of 88 Australian dead and led to a steady 
outpouring of angry commentary by politicians and journalists (see Hirst & 
Schütze 2004). In the second, more recent instance, photographs emerged 
from the Abu Ghraib prison of US service personnel engaged mainly in what 
Darius Rejali (2004) calls stealth tortures but not to the exclusion of other 
forms that left marks upon the body, and led to the deaths of an unknown 
number of detainees. Indeed, one of the images features a US servicewoman, 
thumb raised and grinning approvingly, over the corpse of one of the victims.  
 
These images are starkly different to those that most inhabitants of modern 
western cities associate with criminality. In the urban dystopia portrayed in 
the reality TV world of Cops, America’s Most Wanted, and similar shows 
elsewhere, visual images of individual criminality often conform to two basic 
types. One is comprised of individuals seeking to shield their faces from 
photographers with blankets or items of clothing and so resisting the 
territorialisation of the (criminal) archive. The second is made up of 
‘mugshots’ either provided by authorities or produced by the media itself. 
These latter images are formulaic, constructed and uniformly present sombre 
if sometimes defiant faces. Remorse is not a necessary motif of either of these 
forms but its possibility is implicit in them. That is, the very act of hiding 
one’s face or staring dispassionately out from a ‘mugshot’ is suggestive not 
only of guilt but also contrition. However, the Bali bombers and the Abu 
Ghraib torturers appear to delight in the presence of cameras and the 
opportunity to have their images recorded.  Part of the reason these 
photographs are so affecting is because, unlike the genre of crime 
photographs I have just described, they defy easy categorization, a key issue 
in the newsworthiness calculations of editors and in the more reflective 
domain of image contemplation. (Bourdieu 1999, 172). If, as Bourdieu 
suggests, the first utterance of people describing a photograph is generally 
‘it’s a (landscape, glamour, pornographic) photograph’ then any attempt to 
readily classify smiling torturers at work is rendered highly complex.   
 
Nonetheless, images of violence and abuse are, as Susan Sontag (2004) 
recently suggested, the site of political contestation themselves. That is, what 
is represented by images is often of less concern to powerful interests than 
their existence. Analysing the Bush administration’s response to the photos of 
abuse and torture of Iraqi detainees at Abu Ghraib published in April 2004, 
Sontag observes that the main concern of the administration was limiting 
further circulation of images that were in the public domain and trying to 
prevent the release of what Don Rumsfeld acknowledged were many more 
photographs and videos. Conversely, there has been very little attempt to deal 
with the ‘complex crimes of leadership, policies and authority revealed by the 
pictures.’ It is what is depicted in the photographs themselves rather than 
what these depictions represent that has led to hand wringing in the Bush 
administration (Sontag 2004).   
 
The cool, distancing language of the Bush administration with respect to the 
crimes committed at Abu Ghraib is in stark contrast to Australian government 
and media commentary on images of Amrozi bin Nurhasyim that circulated 
shortly after his arrest about a month after the bombing of October 12 2002. 
Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer commented that photographs 
of the so called smiling bomber were ‘ugly images’ and that the ‘…sort of 
ugly, sneering, amused attitude…is just horrific’ (AAP 2002). The (then) 
Leader of the Opposition, Simon Crean, adopted a slightly different position 
and observed that the ‘…thought that immediately went through my mind is 
that, if you were one of the parents or the relatives…what would you be 
thinking’ (AAP 2002). It seems to me that language of this sort might equally 
be applied to the Abu Ghraib photographs but the Australian, like the US, 
government has been remarkably reluctant to be drawn into public debate 
about them. 
 
The bulk of this article focuses on the Bali bombers about whose smiling 
rather more has been written than that of the Abu Ghraib torturers. However, 
I return to discussion of the Abu Ghraib images later in the article as a means 
of highlighting the different ways in which the images supposedly reveal 
identity. Images of the Bali bombers have formed part of the Australian 
government’s armoury in maintaining public support for its (slight) efforts in 
the war against terror not least by portraying the bombers as the face of the 
enemy in Southeast Asia. But photographs of the Abu Ghraib torturers have 
been represented by the Bush administration as aberrant and a distraction 
from the war against Iraqi and other insurgents. On this view, the 
photographs tell us nothing about the character of the war on terror or of the 
attitudes of US service personnel towards Iraqis, Arabs and Muslims.  
 
However, the first part of the article considers smiling as a political practice 
and attempts to categorise the photographs and their effects as a form of 
symbolic communication.  
 
The Politics of Smiling 
James Scott in his book Domination and the Arts of Resistance argues that 
disguised political grumbling can take many forms including, a look, a groan, 
a sigh, a moan, a chuckle, a silence, a wink or a stare (Scott 1990, 155). This 
builds upon Foucault’s idea of making strange practices that appear as 
natural or common and using them for the purposes of dissent. For example, 
writing in the context of an analysis of laughter and carnival as forms of 
resistance in an era of global finance, Marieke de Goede argues that laughter 
can be treated as a political practice, a form of ambiguous, insidious dissent. 
On this view, laughter, comedy and carnival are important practices of 
criticism because they challenge the rationality of mainstream political 
processes which have little if any place for such ‘irrational’ activities (de 
Goede 2005, 381-382). Achille Mbembe goes further, arguing that in the 
simulacra of postcolonial authoritarianism, laughter in the face of official 
lying ‘…drains officialdom of meaning and sometimes obliges it to function 
while empty and powerless’ (Mbembe 2001,129; Heryanto 1999). John 
Pemberton describes one such expression of ‘…opposition to the current 
order of things…’ in recounting the ‘...howling delight of villagers…’ 
watching Indonesia’s former president, Suharto, delivering an official speech 
whilst standing on his head as a result of someone having turned a Javanese 
bus station’s public television set upside down. While this particular event 
soon played itself out and an appearance of order quickly returned, it 
nonetheless marked a moment of transient opposition to New Order 
authoritarianism (Pemberton 1994, 3-4). 
 
In other recent work on resistance among African Americans in the Jim Crow 
South, scholars such as David Nicholls and Robin Kelley have set out to 
debunk the idea of the ‘seeming acquiescence of the smiling negro laborer’ 
with a view to exploring the ‘hidden history of unorganized, everyday 
conflict…’ that hid behind such smiles (Nicholls 1999). Unsurprisingly, the 
interpretation of smiling as political practice varies from circumstance to 
circumstance. On the one hand, in her 1996 article on women’s resistance to 
the extension of Islamic influence in Iranian society, Donna Hughes notes that 
in 1994 Iranian police as part of a wider campaign to control women’s 
sexuality cautioned women not to smile in the streets because it stoked 
‘satanic desires’ (Feminist Forum 1996). On the other hand, Militant Islam 
Monitor portrays contemporary Fallujah insurgents as ‘barbarism with a 
smiling face’ in itself an attempt to make bizarre the putative unthinking 
hatred of these particular Muslims for the United States and Americans2  
 
These several brief examples are perhaps indicative of a political practice that 
Benedict Anderson describes as entailing symbolic, rather than direct, speech. 
On this view, smiling is a mode of political communication with some 
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similarities to cartooning, rituals, films and advertisements whose 
‘…meanings shift, deepen, invert, or drain away with time.’ The ‘grammar’ of 
such communication is often elusive and the relation between form and 
content is simultaneously more salient and more elusive than other forms of 
political communication (Anderson 1990, 155). However, unlike the 
ephemeral resistance of laughing at an upside down president or smiling at a 
member of the opposite sex in the street, the photographed smile is added to 
the stream of images that jostle and compete for attention in newsrooms 
around the world. Yet once published and despite their being able to be 
examined repeatedly, the photographed smiling faces of the Bali bombers and 
Abu Ghraib torturers do not clarify the ‘grammar’ of this symbolic 
communication. Indeed that the feelings of perplexity experienced by 
consumers of these images have in some cases been transformed into 
bewilderment, anger, rage and disgust suggests both their potency and the 
elusiveness of their meaning. 
 
Moreover, there is a parallel between terrorising through bombing and 
terrorising through torture in that, like smiling, there is a deeply symbolic 
element to these forms of practice and communication (see Hage 2003, 72-75). 
That is, neither the individual act of detonating a large bomb whose strategic 
placement is guaranteed to maim and kill large numbers of people nor the 
repeated acts of violence against individuals and groups of individuals in a 
culture of torture are limited to the events themselves. Bombings in their 
capacity to hurt perceived enemies or to cause outrage through the murder of 
‘innocents’, indicate resistance to perceived domination and injustice and, 
ultimately, assert life and vitality on the part of the communities whose 
actions bombers claim to represent (Hage 2003, 74). Torturers strive not to kill 
their victims but to keep them alive often with a view of re-inserting them 
into the communities from which they are (usually) arbitrarily plucked as 
living demonstrations of the costs of resistance. Such a strategy was widely 
deployed by the Indonesian regime of Suharto that circulated both the living 
and dead as graphic reminders of the price of dissent (Roosa 2003, 316; Tanter 
1991, 131-135). But photography means that ‘real’ bodies are not critical to the 
success of such a strategy. For example, Neil MacMaster argues that during 
the 1950s the French military and police in both Algeria and Paris used 
photographs of tortured and mutilated victims to terrify Algerian FLN 
supporters and that the practice may have been utilised at Abu Ghraib 
(MacMaster 2004, 15). However, the use of photographed mutilated bodies as 
a device to procure information, instil fear or bring about social change is not 
confined to agencies of the state. For example, in insisting upon an open 
casket at his 1955 funeral, Emmitt Till’s mother was determined to use the 
widely circulated images of her lynched 14 year old son to provoke protest 
and mobilise the African American community (Campbell 2004, 57).  
 
But there is a key difference between the smiles of the Bali bombers and Abu 
Ghraib torturers. While it appears that in both cases the individuals involved 
were mere subordinates in networks of violence and domination, I read the 
weapons of the Bali bombers and their subsequent smiling in the face of 
interrogation, trial and sentencing as weapons of the weak. That is, acts of 
non-state terror are often carried out by individuals and groups with only a 
limited range of extreme options available to them because of asymmetries of 
power.3 However, while the Abu Ghraib torturers appear to have been acting 
in accordance with instructions from higher (perhaps much higher) in the 
chain of command, they wear the uniform of the most powerful military 
apparatus yet known in the history of human-kind and as individuals within 
that apparatus, enjoyed relations of almost complete domination over those 
incarcerated and under their control (see Hersh 2004).4 It is beyond the scope 
of this article to explore the ways in which ordinary people are trained or 
have experiences that enable them to carry out extraordinary violence or 
torture. Nonetheless, allegations that military recruits are abused during 
training by their superiors and other more experienced peers arise routinely 
                                                 
3 Based on interviews with Arabs involved in the Palestinian struggle, Ghassan Hage 
characterises suicide bombing as ‘…a marriage between the necessity of resistance and the 
quantitative and qualitative deprivation of military hardware’ (Hage 2003:73). 
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chain of command is beyond the scope of this article. However, Edward Greer argues that 
‘the systematic deployment of torture on captured Islamists’ is American policy and practice 
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enough to safely argue that marking difference through violence is deeply 
ingrained in military cultures.  
 
Before analysing the public interrogation of Amrozi bin Nurhasyim and 
predominantly Australian reactions to it, I wish to touch upon the particular 
history that smiling has in representations of Balinese culture. 
 
Bali: Land of Smiles? 
One of the striking effects of the bombing and photographs of the bombers 
published in the mainstream media is the contrast they provide to the Bali 
long regarded as a place of tranquil beauty and routinely gendered as 
feminine. That is, popular images of Bali largely produced and circulated by 
the tourism industry depict a tropical, fertile, green island fringed by 
beautiful beaches and populated by receptive, happy, contented people 
willing to share their good fortune with western tourists. A recurrent motif of 
Bali in tourism literature is its description as the island or land of smiles while 
smiling is a characteristic often ascribed to ordinary Balinese whose Hindu 
religion sets them apart from the Javanese to the west and Sasaks of Lombok 
to the east. For example, internet travel company Indo.com, refers to the 
Balinese as having ‘mystical smiles’5 while without hint of irony, News 
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Corporation’s Matthew Brace recently reported that Balinese people are 
saying that ‘Bali has got its smile back.’6  
 
This vision is often coupled with an image of Bali as threatened by the very 
irresistibility of its allure for tourists from all over the developed world. Such 
representations of paradise and paradise under threat are inherently 
Orientalist but elide similarly essentialist Dutch colonial representations of 
the Balinese as savage and war-like that prevailed up until the early decades 
of the 20th century. Moreover, it is only forty years ago that violence erupted 
with particular ferocity in the wake of the alleged communist coup attempt of 
1965 that brought Suharto to power in Indonesia (see Cribb et al 1990, 241-60). 
Ironically, Suharto, long supported by US and Australian governments 
among others (initially because of his slaughtering of the Indonesian 
Communist Party membership and its real and imagined fellow travellers), 
was sometimes nicknamed ‘the smiling general’, the title of an early 
biography of Suharto (Roeder 1969). Suharto’s carefully self-cultivated 
avuncular image was further nurtured by sympathetic western governments 
eager to maintain his preference for ‘…Indonesia’s position of essential 
invisibility…in the international media’ (see Pemberton 1994, 4). 
 
                                                 
6 (http://escape.news.com.au/story/0,9142,9166145-27983,00.html accessed 20/7/04) 
In the present, contemporary feminised representations of the warm, open, 
receptive Balinese can be interpreted as a measure of the economic and social 
changes wrought by tourism in Bali. That is, the welcoming smiles of the 
Balinese can be read as symbolic of their subjugation and integration into the 
global economy. Indeed, as James Scott argues, shows of discursive 
affirmation from below are valuable because they contribute to the 
impression that the symbolic order is willingly accepted by its least 
advantaged members (Scott 1990, 58). Now while it may be difficult to make a 
case that the Balinese are (economically) disadvantaged as a result of mass 
tourism, it is plausible to argue that the smile serves to demonstrate Balinese 
acceptance of their status as tourist Mecca7. Visual depictions of the happy, 
smiling Balinese in tourism advertising confirms for travellers that Bali has 
been tamed, stabilised and made welcoming by the capital of travellers from 
around the world, which helps locate Bali in the globalised hierarchy of 
nations. In this sense, Bali, as Adrian Vickers argues, is a paradise created 
(Vickers 1989). 
 
Bali is not an independent nation but my implying that it is, is deliberate. 
Prior to the bombing Bali was widely regarded by Australians and others as 
                                                 
7 The term ‘Mecca for foreigners’ along with accompanying images of Bali beaches was used 
on the (US) NBC Evening News on October 12 2002. See Richard Fox, ‘From chaos to 
coherence: Critical comments on media coverage of the October 12th bombing in Bali’ 
Conference paper presented to the Third International Convention of Asia Scholars, 19-22 
August 2003. 
an oasis of calm and security in what the Australian government described in 
its 1998 Defence White Paper as an arc of instability (see Philpott 2001a). To 
varying degrees, fear of Indonesia has been a leitmotiv of Australian relations 
with that (and other Asian nations) nation for decades. Reporting of Indonesia 
in the Australian media generally conforms to a shorthand of (white) 
Australian insecurity by invoking its enormous population, its status as the 
world’s largest Muslim nation and by emphasizing the political instability, 
violence and division that have characterised much of Indonesia’s 
independent history (see Philpott 2001). But Bali seemed immune to the 
problems that beset Indonesia although even minimal inquiry into 
contemporary Balinese social relations and its recent history demonstrates the 
folly of this belief.  
 
Moreover, given the widespread discursive practice of identifying threats to a 
polity’s security as arising from outside its borders , it is not surprising that 
the Balinese themselves have increasingly made a point of linking social 
problems on the island with the influx of other (primarily Muslim Javanese) 
Indonesians to Bali (see Allen 2004). In the wake of the bombing, the Balinese 
and the western media struggled to accept that this was an act with its genesis 
within the Balinese community.  Indeed, within hours, speculation mounted 
in the media that the bombing was inspired by Al Qaeda thereby invoking 
radical Islam and suggesting that a new theatre in the war on terror was 
imminent (see Fox 2003).  On this view, the bombing of a nightclub in Bali 
constitutes not only mass murder, but also an attack on the thin sovereignty 
extended over Bali by (mainly) Australian tourists and the destruction of an 
idyll central to a certain Australian way of life.8 Beyond the immediate 
outrage, the bombing was, arguably, read as a betrayal of the paradise that it 
had become for many western tourists. One Australian headline a week after 
the bombing captures precisely this mood: ‘Paradise lost in Bali blast’ 
(Jackson and Brook 2002).  
 
Amrozi’s smiling for the media challenges the economic hierarchy of 
globalisation by emptying the Balinese smile of its symbolic content of passive 
acceptance of mass western tourism and recoding it as a marker of violent 
resistance.  This argument resonates with the view of the curator of 
Inconvenient Evidence, an exhibition of Abu Ghraib photographs recently 
showing in New York. Brian Wallis argues that images like those from Abu 
Ghraib raise ‘…questions about how photographs can be used as propaganda 
to assert cultural dominance locally and as triumphant trophies of war that 
serve to reinforce racial and political hierarchies globally.’9 On this view, the 
persistent smiling of Amrozi and other bombers can be and is, I think, read by 
                                                 
8 Rebecca Stein notes that Palestinian attacks on Israeli cafes have similarly been represented 
in the Israeli media as containing a highly symbolic element. See Stein 2003. 
9 (http://www.icp.org/exhibitions/abu_ghraib/introduction.html accessed 5/10/04). My thanks 
to David Campbell for bringing this exhibition to my attention. 
the western media, governments and ordinary consumers of media images as 
the celebration of a victory in a skirmish whose broader context, however 
inchoate, is to overturn precisely the racial and political hierarchies Wallis 
refers to. The smiling, seemingly the very antithesis of remorse and regret, is 
thus read in the west as a form of symbolic political resistance and perhaps an 
appeal to others dissatisfied with the existing order of things.  
 
The Interrogation and Trial of the Smiling Bomber: 
Amrozi bin Nurhasyim was arrested about a month after the bombing of the 
Sari bar and nightclub in Kuta, Bali on October 12 2002. He was paraded 
before the Indonesian national and the international media by the Balinese 
police who, with Australian Federal Police assistance, conducted the 
investigation into the bombing. Public interrogation of a suspect is unusual in 
Indonesia and proved to be a light hearted event. Indeed, at one point Amrozi 
gestured towards western journalists saying ‘It’s people like them who I was 
trying to kill!’ a comment producing fits of laughter from many in the room, 
including the interrogating officers (Goodsir & Miller 2002).   
 
To most non-Indonesian observers, the public interrogation of Amrozi but 
more particularly his smiling countenance and jocular manner were 
unusually offensive, provoked media and political comment in Australia and 
entrenched the already hostile view of him held by many Australians.  
Headlines in leading Australian broadsheets capture both the perplexity and 
anger concerning the events surrounding Amrozi’s parading and 
interrogation: ‘Outrage over “bizarre, insensitive” interview’ (The Age, 
14/11/02); ‘Smiling assassin interview “a circus”: police chief’ (Sydney Morning 
Herald, 14/11/02); ‘Laughing bomber on parade’ (Sydney Morning Herald, 
14/11/02); ‘Howard repulsed by grinning bomber’ (The Age, 15/11/02).  
 
Amrozi was duly tried and convicted, now under appeal, for his role in the 
bombing and sentenced to death. But long before these events, indeed, within 
hours of his arrest and interrogation, the Australian Foreign Minister in 
calling him bloodthirsty effectively pronounced Amrozi guilty. Arguably, the 
widespread abuse of legal processes, a hallmark of the war on terror, 
contributed to the decision of the Indonesian police to turn Amrozi’s 
interrogation into a public forum. For example, Sydney Morning Herald 
reporter Wayne Miller suggested that the parading of Amrozi may have been 
a spontaneous response to the ‘enormous pressure’ Indonesian police had 
been under from across the archipelago and an attempt to alleviate suspicion 
that Amrozi was a merely a patsy to convince sceptical Indonesian and 
international publics that the police were on top of the investigation (Miller 
2002). Interestingly, these assertions are made in a brief article entitled 
‘Interview made perfect sense to Indonesians’ which, given the 
incomprehensible scenes for Australian observers, serves to place distance 
between the bereaved of both countries (the second largest component among 
the dead were 38 Indonesians) and plays upon white Australian insecurity 
with respect to Indonesia.10  
 
Miller argues that in Indonesia it is the cultural norm:  
 
…not to show anger, and to laugh out of embarrassment or to show 
compassion. The interview room looked like everybody was happy, 
and this was good for the police and Muslims. It is important to 
Muslims that they tell the truth, and in this regard Amrozi publicly 
measured up (Miller 2002).  
 
An Indonesian commentator agreed, arguing laughing in Indonesia is 
sometimes just ‘…a manifestation of nervousness or embarrassment’ (Fatwa 
in Faroque 2002). 
 
However, there are several reasons for treating with caution Miller’s 
argument. Firstly, before there was a clear picture established about the 
motives and motivations for the bombing, Amrozi’s religion becomes a focal 
point of analysis of his behaviour, implying a link between Islam and 
Amrozi’s criminal actions. This implication fits all too comfortably with 
discourses of the war on terror with their Orientalist imaginings of an 
inherently violent Islam. On this view, Amrozi’s personal responsibility for 
                                                 
10 Just what Indonesian audiences made of the interrogation is an open question. However, 
Angus Trumble, without supporting evidence, claims that the Indonesian media paid little 
attention to the interrogation and made little or no comment about Amrozi’s demeanour. See 
Trumble 2004: xxxii-xxxiii. 
his (alleged) crimes is collapsed into his religious beliefs. Secondly, if it is 
accepted that the bombing is motivated by Islamic anger, then it seems 
unlikely that the bombers will be concerned about appearing as ‘good 
Muslims’ of the kind Miller identifies. It seems inconceivable that a well 
mannered Muslim would be making admissions of (and later convicted for) 
mass murder! Thirdly, Miller makes no attempt to analyse the interrogation 
as a media event despite recognising police anxiety as an influential factor in 
the decision to parade Amrozi. Dewi Anggraeni, the Australian 
correspondent for the Indonesian newsweekly Tempo, agrees arguing that the 
public interrogation was ‘an unusual public relations exercise…mainly for the 
benefit of the international media’ (Anggraeni 2002a). Moreover, Aggraeni 
suggests the Indonesian police were anxious to show Indonesians and the 
wider international community not only that they were making progress with 
their investigation but also that Amrozi had not been subjected to pressure or 
bullying. Thus, the Indonesian police chief, Da’i Bachtiar, was amenable to 
laughing at Amrozi’s ‘inane comments’ to demonstrate the non-coercive 
relationship that existed for the purposes of the interrogation (Anggraeni 
2002a). Melbourne University’s head of Indonesian studies, Arief Budiman 
endorses this line of argument, suggesting that ‘…there is often a “rapport” 
between suspect and police….they still arrest and punish, but somehow 
communication is more “personal”’ (Faroque 2002). For Amrozi however, the 
possibility of demonstrating his closeness with no less than the Indonesian 
chief of police was an opportunity perhaps too good to pass up (Anggraeni 
2002)! Whatever the intentions of the police, the interview cannot be regarded 
as a success if it was meant to impress western observers, a point emphasised 
by Indonesia specialist Richard Chauvel who argues that the Indonesian 
police failed to understand the way that the public interrogation would be 
understood internationally (Faroque 2002).  
 
While it is impossible to establish whether Amrozi was consciously pursuing 
a strategy of resistance, his irreverent conduct in the face of state power is not 
without precedent in contemporary Indonesia. Indeed, extensive media 
coverage makes it at least possible that Amrozi would be aware of 
unconventional styles of resistance that characterised the late Suharto era. For 
example, Ariel Heryanto documents students standing trial for various kinds 
of dissent and treating courts as ‘…fiesta[s] of simulacra…’ stripping them of 
their legality and rationality. Students devised numerous methods to disrupt 
proceedings (rather than contesting their legality) including organising mass 
pizza deliveries to the court, falsely advertising jobs and arranging for job 
interviews to be conducted by a trial judge at the time and place where 
verdicts were being delivered, and, dressing as bandage-wrapped zombies 
(Heryanto 1999, 165-166). Amrozi’s conduct and that of his colleagues 
similarly mocks state power and threatens its legitimacy by drawing 
investigating officers into a simulacrum of state authority. Ironically, in 
attempting to demonstrate their efficiency and rigour, Indonesian police 
participated in undermining the veracity of the interrogation. 
 
The western media also inadvertently contributes to doubts about the 
interrogation and later, the trial, by tapping into a long history of 
representations of Muslims as violent but also inept (Eisele 2002, 87). For 
example, Matthew Moore (2002) gently mocked Indonesian authorities who 
claimed they ‘forgot’ that Imam Samudra (allegedly the mastermind of the 
Bali bombings) was already wanted for questions about bombings when they 
inadvertently issued two new identity cards to him in 1999 and 2000.  And in 
expressing her surprise at the reasonably prompt arrest of Amrozi, Jane 
Perlez (2002) simply observes that police in Indonesia are ‘…largely corrupt 
and not overly competent.’ Interestingly, the officer in charge of the 
investigation, Gen. I Made Mangku Pastika (a Hindu), acknowledged the lack 
of faith in the police’s competence while highlighting the ‘several basic 
mistakes’ made by the bombers and which led to their becoming suspects 
quite early in the investigation (Perlez 2002). The implied amateurishness of 
the operation is further emphasised by one of the bombers himself. In a re-
enactment of the bombing, one of the suspects, Ali Imron, joked, claimed not 
to know that Australia was an ally of the US, and told police that the bombers 
had forgotten to attach the mobile phone that was to be used to detonate the 
bomb (Moore 2003). Moreover, prior to the arrest of the suspects, numerous 
Indonesian observers and commentators argued that the bombing had to be 
the work of foreign elements, the operation being too large and too 
sophisticated to be the work of Indonesians (Moore 2003a). The pervasiveness 
of Orientalist accounts of identity appear starkly in such utterances. 
 
Thus, unwittingly or otherwise, the bombers through their conduct in the face 
of authority stripped away perceptions of its competence and legitimacy and 
in this are, inadvertently, assisted by the western media.  That is, 
representations of the bombers as yet more hateful and vengeful madmen 
with unclear motives for their violence against the west draws upon and 
extends the Orientalist discourses of Islamic otherness (see Eisele 2002, 87). 
On this view, the actions of the bombers are explicable only to the extent that 
unthinking violence is integral to Muslim culture and identity (Karim 2003, 
73-87).  
 
Amrozi’s seemingly cheerful demeanour continued throughout his trial, his 
conviction and his sentencing to death by the trial judge on August 7 2003. 
The Philippine Daily Inquirer (2003) editorialised that the judiciary helped fix 
the smile on Amrozi’s face by granting his desire for martyrdom and thus 
becomes complicit in the crime. But arguably, Amrozi’s smiling can also be 
read as a means of circulating images of encouragement and resistance among 
an audience with strong feelings of antipathy towards the US and its wars on 
terror and Iraq but who perhaps waver in the face of taking direct action 
against perceived enemies. Jason Burke makes much the same point in 
arguing that the videoing, copying and distribution of the execution of 
western hostages in Iraq is proving a highly successful radicalising and 
recruitment technology for Muslim militants (Burke 2004). 
 
By trial’s end the images of Amrozi in particular had become hyper-real; a 
story in themselves and disconnected from the events that the images 
originally illustrated.11 Arguably, the vengefulness incited in consumers of 
these images draws them into complicity with the worst excesses of the war 
against terror. That is, the images, by ‘proving’ the barbarity of those George 
Bush routinely refers to as evil-doers, contribute to the maintenance of 
sufficient public support for continuing detention without trial of those 
incarcerated by the US as a result of its campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
endorsement of the illegal doctrine of pre-emption and the erosion of legal 
process and civil liberties in the western democracies and beyond.12  For 
example, senior Australian government members and their counterparts in 
the Opposition put aside official and bi-partisan Australian opposition to the 
death penalty and endorsed the death sentence handed down to Amrozi by 
                                                 
11 The concept of hyper-reality is of course Baudrillard’s.  
12 I acknowledge this is a bold comment, but the governments of George Bush, John Howard 
and Tony Blair have been comfortably returned in recent elections despite a great deal of 
evidence suggesting that vital information was withheld from the public and ignored by 
these administrations in their determination to invade Iraq. 
the Indonesian court (Kingston 2003). Moreover, in the wake of the 
overturning by the Constitutional Court of Idris’s conviction with respect to 
his role in the Bali bombing, the father of one of the victims demanded that 
the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister ‘…do something [because] unless we 
stop them, nobody else is going to’. In reiterating his desire that the bombers 
be shot, this individual’s respect for due process and Indonesia’s sovereignty 
simply vanishes (see AAP 2004).   
 
Photographs, Having Fun and Identity: 
Upon seeing Amrozi’s smiling post-arrest appearance in late 2002 the 
Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, commented that ‘I think 
these people are so bloodthirsty, their sort of ugly sneering, amused attitude 
at the slaughter of innocent people is just horrific’ (Miller 2002). Yet also in 
2002 Australia’s conservative Howard government took a decision to 
discontinue funding of a mere $1million to support Asian language 
programmes in Australian schools. One immediate effect of the cutting of 
Asian language programme support has been a 75% reduction in Indonesian 
language enrolments in Australian universities. The government seems 
happy enough with the fact that more than 50% of 13-14 year olds cannot find 
Indonesia on a map and less than a quarter know Indonesia is a majority 
Muslim nation (Williams 2004). The lack of curiosity about the lives and 
motivations of what appear to be the most ordinary of people turned mass-
murderers suggests that the photographs of the smiling bombers tell ‘us’ all 
‘we’ need to know about ‘them’ to reaffirm ‘our’ commitments to the war on 
terror.  
 
And yet according to George Bush, images of US service personnel torturing 
Iraqi detainees at Abu Ghraib tell us nothing about the US or the US military 
and that they are inconsistent with the ‘true nature and heart of America’ 
(Sontag 2004; MacMaster 2004, 14). No such subtle distinctions have been 
drawn by western politicians with respect to photographs of the Bali 
bombers. The grinning torturers are represented by the Bush administration 
as a few bad eggs that have brought disrepute on the US. James Inhofe, an 
Oklahoman Republican and member of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee goes further declaring himself (among others) as ‘outraged by the 
outrage’ with respect to the photographs and arguing that Americans are the 
true victims in trying to deal with those he describes as murderers, insurgents 
and terrorists. Moreover, the photographs rather than providing evidence of a 
culture of abuse and giving cause for reflection and disciplinary action are 
portrayed by Inhofe as the work of ‘the media’ at whose feet he lays the blame 
for what he regards as the inevitable American deaths that will arise from the 
photographs. (Sontag 2004).  
 
Lack of clear, unambiguous condemnation, including use of the word torture 
to describe what happened at Abu Ghraib, on the part of the Bush 
administration has, arguably, helped create a mood for exoneration among 
large sections of the American public. For example, one caller to Rush 
Limbaugh’s widely syndicated radio programme argued that too much was 
being read into the photos from Abu Ghraib and that they were synonymous 
with fraternity hazing parties in the US. Limbaugh himself suggested that the 
explanation for the actions of the US soldiers engaged in abuses of Iraqi 
detainees was a form of emotional release in response to the pressures of 
daily life in Iraq for US service-people. They were, according to Limbaugh, 
simply having a good time (Sontag 2004). The issue of whether Lynndie 
England and Charles Graner were merely ‘joking around, having some fun, 
during the night shift’ is the contentious heart of the trial of Private England 
as England now claims she was coerced by the US army into making these 
admissions (AP 2004). Interestingly, photographs13 of (white) Australian 
servicemen in mock Ku Klux Klan hoods looming over (Aboriginal and dark 
skinned) colleagues have also recently described by Australian conservative 
MP Peter Lindsay as ‘a fun thing before the troops went overseas…the spirit 
of thing that out in the general community, nobody would even turn a hair at’ 
(AAP 2004b). The flat refusal of governments to draw the links between 
                                                 
13 The photographs came to light and were published in the Australian media on November 
11th 2004, Remembrance Day, but were allegedly taken in September 2000 before the troops in 
question were deployed to East Timor. 
hazing abuses and abuses of combatants and detainees defies decades of 
seemingly obvious evidence to the contrary.  
 
On this view, rather than being an aberration, the Abu Ghraib photographs 
digitally manifest what Sontag calls the Bush administration’s ‘pseudo-
religious doctrine of…endless war’ (Sontag 2004)14. Moreover, as Darius Rejali 
argues, the mode of abuse suggests not that US soldiers acted out of 
ignorance but in full awareness of the particular forms of humiliation inflicted 
on Muslim Arab men. ‘Cultural torture’ is invented by people from outside of 
the societies it is inflicted upon. It is not born of indifference or ignorance but 
calculated maliciousness (Rejali 2004a; Hersh 2004). In this instance, the US 
military, drawing upon Orientalist anthropology, formed the view that Arab 
men are particularly fearful of sexual humiliation which perhaps explains not 
only the nature of the torture of the Abu Ghraib detainees but the 
involvement of US servicewomen (MacMaster 2004, 15). Such views lend 
weight to the argument that torture never occurs in isolation but is ‘…one key 
component in a wider, integrated system of repression’ (MacMaster 2004, 6).  
 
                                                 
14 Significantly influential Christians in US public life have, intentionally or otherwise, given 
credence to Sontag’s argument by describing Islam’s claims to be peace loving as fraudulent 
(Pat Robertson), by describing Islam as evil and wicked (Franklin Graham), and by describing 
Muhammad as a demon possessed paedophile (Jerry Falwell). See Chris McGillion, ‘Beware 
Christ’s zealots as they fan the flames’, Sydney Morning Herald, 15/10/02. 
The genealogy of the Abu Ghraib images may be found in the post US civil 
war practice of lynching and in recording images of such events (Carby 2004). 
Hazel Carby argues that in both cases the images can be regarded as messages 
to be shared among oppressors. They also serve as celebration of the wielding 
of power, the performance of conquest over an enemy and as a warning to 
others of what awaits them should they challenge such power. On this view, 
photographs are a brutal assertion of supremacy over possible future victims 
(see Campbell 2004, 57). David Campbell draws similar conclusions about the 
practice of lynching, arguing that photographs were necessary to ensure their 
status as historical events (Campbell 2004, 57). Moreover, the highly ritualised 
posing of bodies, both alive and dead, by lynching parties and the Abu 
Ghraib torturers is evidence of the pleasure taken in torture and killing.15 The 
element of ritualised display extends to the facial expressions of the 
perpetrators ‘including smiles of pride in accomplishment, as if the torturers 
have truly dispensed justice’ (Carby 2004).16   
 
Curiously then, the Bali bombers and Abu Ghraib torturers may be smiling 
because they are satisfied in their dispensing of rough justice and seek to 
establish a historical record of their actions. Yet the Australian and US 
                                                 
15 Darius Rejali suggests that the smiling can be interpreted as Carby proposes, may be a 
measure of the surreal events in which relatively inexperienced people like the Abu Ghraib 
torturers find themselves in, or may be a way of making all consumers of the images 
complicit with the crimes. Personal communication, September 2004. 
16 (See, for example: http://www.maafa.org/lynch3.html accessed 27/10/04). 
governments respectively have interpreted the images quite differently. For 
the Australian government and journalists close to it such as the foreign 
editor of The Australian, Greg Sheridan, the smiling faces of the Bali bombers 
are evil personified, a mantra repeated endlessly not only in the wake of the 
bombing, the interrogations and trials of the bombers, but also throughout the 
war on terror (Hirst & Schütze  2004). But there is little in the public 
statements of the bombers to suggest that they bring any sophisticated 
political thought to their criminal actions or prior to their crimes had anything 
other than ordinary lives. The Australian government poses as equally 
unsophisticated in its commentary on the bombers, demonstrates little or no 
interest in understanding the complex nature of political Islam in Indonesia 
but parrots the ‘they hate us because of who we are’ line that plays like an 
endless advertising slogan for the war on terror (Hirst & Schütze 2004). In a 
broader sense, the unreflective category of terrorist is itself a form of symbolic 
violence that enables the pathologisation of some kinds of violence, the 
normalisation of others. It is the normalisation of the US’s imperial violence in 
contemporary Iraq that influences the ways that ‘we’ distinguish between 
ethical and illegitimate violence (see Hage 2003, 72)17. 
 
Conclusion: 
                                                 
17 Hage’s arguments specifically concern Palestinian suicide bombers and their role in the 
campaign against Israeli colonialism but the principle, I think, is relevant to my discussion. 
While it is impossible to clearly establish the motivations for the criminal 
behaviour of the relatively few people depicted in the photographs analysed 
in this article, their seemingly cheerful dispositions, most in evidence through 
their smiling, has added complexity to the simple ‘with us or against us’ logic 
of the US and its allies since September 11 2001.  On the one hand, published 
images of the Bali bombers have drawn upon and extended Orientalist 
accounts of an unthinkingly, instinctually violent Muslim world. Ironically, 
this has occurred despite serious Australian media attempts at analysing the 
conduct of the bombers whose smiling visages have become the hyper-real 
leitmotiv of the bombings in Bali. On the other hand, the Bush administration 
has sought to downplay the significance of the Abu Ghraib torturers at work 
arguing that they are no more than evidence of a limited number of 
undisciplined actions. Unlike photographs of the Bali bombers that allegedly 
prove their bloodthirsty barbarity, images of US service personnel tell ‘us’ 
nothing at all about ‘ourselves’, the US, its service personnel or the tactics 
entailed in waging the war on terror according to the Bush administration. 
The photographs tell ‘us’ almost nothing and distract ‘our’ attention from the 
tasks laid down by the war on terror. 
 
In both instances the rush to impose meaning on these perplexing images by 
powerful interests forecloses upon the possibility of understanding the 
symbolic communications entailed in these images. This is entirely in keeping 
with the character of the war on terror where to ask questions, or to hold the 
view that the world does not necessarily turn to us a legible face, is to join 
with the ranks of the evil-doers. Perhaps then the photographs tell us rather 
more about ‘ourselves’ than we could care to acknowledge. 
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